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• The dominant trends in ﬁnancing behaviour in the
Canadian economy in the 1960s and early 1970s were the
rising indebtedness of the household sector and the declining
indebtedness of the government sector relative to GDP.A s
well, through the 1970s, with the rise in inﬂation and the
associatedincreaseinnominalinterestratesanduncertainty,
the non-ﬁnancial business sector relied increasingly on
bank loans and short-term paper for its ﬁnancing.
• From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, driven by govern-
ment deficits, the share of marketable debt issues as a source
of ﬁnance increased signiﬁcantly. Since the mid-1990s,
the dominant trend has been a decline in debt issued by
government, which has been offset to a considerable extent
by rapidly growing capital market ﬁnancing by the
corporate sector.
• The current proportion of ﬁnancing from capital market
sources for the non-ﬁnancial business sector in Canada is
broadly similar to what it was thirty years ago.
• Despite some increased reliance by the Canadian corporate
sector on foreign sources of funds over the last decade, the
data do not provide much support for the view that domestic
capital markets have been abandoned by Canadian ﬁrms
or “hollowed out” in recent years.
• An efficient regulatory system and ongoing fiscal discipline
on the part of Canadian governments are important for the
continuing development of the corporate capital market in
Canada. As well, recent trends in increased innovation
and improved risk assessment in Canadian capital
markets need to continue.
he ﬁnancial sector plays a vital role in facili-
tating economic growth. Its most important
function is to match borrowers who are short
offundsforpotentiallyproﬁtableinvestment
projects with lenders or investors who have surplus
funds. This intermediation role dates back hundreds
of years, but has obviously changed greatly over time.
Among the most signiﬁcant changes are the ways
services are provided, theinstruments used to provide
the services, and the nature of the entities providing
them.1 Today's complex ﬁnancial landscape, with
such instruments as asset-backed securities, interest
rate swaps, and credit derivatives, is a far cry from the
landscape of the 1950s, for example, and even further
removed from the landscape of earlier historical peri-
ods.
Today's complex ﬁnancial landscape
. . . is a far cry from . . .
the landscape of earlier
historical periods.
This article focuses on the changing pattern of lending
and borrowing in Canada over a fairly long period,
including the types of ﬁnancial instruments used and
the relative roles of ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial
markets. Speciﬁcally, it considers developments that
have affected the process of transferring resources
1.   See Freedman and Goodlet (1998, 2002) for a discussion of these changes.
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from lenders to borrowers from several perspectives
and, in doing so, poses a number of questions:
• How have the ﬁnancing patterns of bor-
rowers—non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial cor-
porations, households, and govern-
ments—changed over time? A key aspect
that is examined is the change in the rela-
tive importance of ﬁnancial institutions
and ﬁnancial markets in intermediating
between lenders and borrowers.
• How have the mechanisms—the instru-
ments available to lenders and borrow-
ers—by which ultimate lenders supply
funds to ultimate borrowers changed over
time?
• What are the challenges going forward?
Is the changing behaviour of banks vis-à-
vis large corporate borrowers a cause for
concern? Does it matter whether financing
takes place mainly through markets,
through institutions, or through some
combination of the two? Are our ﬁnancial
markets in danger of disappearing because
of the size and pre-eminence of U.S. ﬁnan-
cial markets? What are the implications
of such a development, should it occur?
Are there legal or regulatory obstacles
that lessen the efficiency of our financial
markets?
The article takes a long-term view, drawing on data
covering the last thirty to forty years.2 This enabled us
to take a broad perspective on the forces behind the
changing ﬁnancial environment in Canada and
helped us to assess some of the important challenges
facing the ﬁnancial sector today.
Major Borrowing Patterns of the
Non-Financial Sector
We begin with a broad overview of ﬁnancing patterns
in credit markets over the past forty years, where
credit market obligations include loans, mortgages,
short-term paper, and bonds, but exclude the equity
capital of corporations. Using Statistics Canada data,
we classify patterns of borrowing among the various
sectors.
2.   Because none of the data sources throws light on all the pertinent issues,
we used various statistical databases, although we recognize that there are
some inconsistencies across them. The primary data sources are Statistics
Canada’s Balance Sheet and Financial Flow accounts; the Bank of Canada’s
data on credit, outstanding bonds, and net issues by type of borrower; and
data from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).
By type of borrower
Chart 1 shows outstanding debt of domestic non-
ﬁnancial sectors (persons and unincorporated busi-
nesses, non-ﬁnancial private corporations and govern-
mententerprises,andgovernments)asapercentageof
nominal GDP.
These data indicate that, over the period, the debt of
persons and unincorporated businesses has increased
relative to GDP. While both consumer credit and mort-
gage credit contributed to this rapid rate of growth,
mortgage credit has been more notable in this regard,
gradually increasing its share of household debt over
most of the period. The only sustained period during
which debt in this sector grew less rapidly than GDP
was the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. This was a response to
the situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when
there were extremely high rates of interest associated
with inﬂation, along with a steep recession and a
sharp decline in housing prices.
The debt of the government sector declined relative to
GDP until the mid-1970s as governments ran budget
surpluses or small deﬁcits. Over the next two decades,
as governments ran large deﬁcits, the ratio of govern-
ment debt to GDP more than doubled, rising from
about 40 per cent in the mid-1970s to over 90 per cent
in the mid-1990s. It subsequently fell back to under
70 per cent in 2002 as governments balanced their
budgets or ran surpluses.
Outstanding debt of the non-ﬁnancial business sector
(including non-ﬁnancial government enterprises) var-
Chart 1
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ied between 44 and 49 per cent of GDPin the 1960s and
the ﬁrst half of the 1970s and ﬂuctuated in the 54 to 64
per cent range for much of the following period. This
rise in debt relative to GDP is partly accounted for by
the relative decline of equity in non-ﬁnancial private
corporations (i.e., a rise in the overall debt-to-equity
ratio).
By type of instrument
In Chart 2, we classify outstanding debt by the nature
of the credit instrument used—loans, mortgages, and
marketable debt (short-term paper and bonds).3 The
notable decrease through the 1960s and 1970s in the
reliance on marketable debt corresponds to the rise in
the use of mortgages and non-mortgage borrowing
from ﬁnancial institutions. This reﬂects, in part, the
declining importance of governments as borrowers,
since governments typically fund themselves by issu-
ing marketable debt. At the same time, the rise in the
relative importance of borrowing by households
tended to increase the amount of borrowing from
ﬁnancial institutions, both mortgage and non-mort-
gage, since households, lacking access to debt mar-
kets, borrow almost entirely from ﬁnancial
institutions.
The third major group, the corporate sector, uses both
markets and ﬁnancial institutions as sources of funds.
3.   In this database, bonds include Canada Savings Bonds (CSBs), which are
not marketable, but are highly liquid. The conclusions would not be affected
by the exclusion of CSBs from the bond measures.
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Non-mortgage loans from ﬁnancial institutions
Through much of the 1970s, corporations sharply
increased their use of bank loans, largely because of
the rise in inﬂation rates over this period and the asso-
ciated rise in nominal interest rates. Given the great
uncertainty during the 1970s about the outlook for
future inﬂation and nominal interest rates, lenders
and corporate borrowers were reluctant to lock them-
selves into longer-term instruments. From the stand-
point of the corporate borrower, if the rate of inﬂation
fell, the ex post real rate it would take on by issuing
medium- or long-term debt would be punitive. From
the perspective of the lender, if inﬂation and nominal
interest rates rose, the ex post real interest rates on
longer-term debt would be negative. Under these con-
ditions, corporations principally ﬁnanced themselves
using loans from the chartered banks,4 while lenders
shifted into short-term instruments, including shorter-
term bank deposits.
What distinguished bank loans from bonds was the
ﬂoating-rate nature of most bank loans (at an interest
rate tied to the prime rate). Marketable bonds, in con-
trast, locked in the interest rate for a longer period. At
the time, a ﬂoating-rate longer-term bond with inter-
est rates tied to a short-term market instrument that
tend to adjust with the rate of inﬂation was not availa-
ble in the Canadian market. In the absence of such a
bond, corporate borrowers shifted to bank loans to an
important extent.
Returning to the overall picture, through the 1980s the
share of marketable debt increased signiﬁcantly at the
expense of non-mortgage borrowing from ﬁnancial
institutions. This reﬂected in part the increase in the
relative importance of government borrowing which,
as noted earlier, is conducted mainly via bond issues.
This tendency was accentuated by the slowdown in
the growth of household borrowing from ﬁnancial
institutions in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s and the reduc-
tion through the decade in the relative importance of
loans in corporate borrowing. The 1990s saw fairly
stable shares of credit ﬁnanced through the different
instruments, since the increasing share of bonds and
debentures issued by corporations tended to offset the
declining role of governments and the increasing role
of households as borrowers. Both of these latter devel-
opments acted to increase the importance of ﬁnancial
institutions relative to markets.
An important caveat is that these data are deﬁned in
terms of the nature of the originating lender and do
4.   During this period there were also large numbers of mergers and acquisi-
tions, which increased the overall demand for funds, particularly bank loans,
by the corporate sector.6 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
not take into account subsequent developments. As
we shall see, an appreciable proportion of mortgage
debt and household credit is now securitized and, for
some purposes, should be included with marketable
debt. That said, the securitization numbers are not so
large as to seriously distort the interpretation of the
broad trends set out above. 5
Borrowing by the ﬁnancial sector
Chart 3 shows that, in recent years, ﬁnancial entities
have increased their use of credit markets more rap-
idly than have domestic non-ﬁnancial borrowers. A
key factor in this increase has been the issue of bonds
and short-term paper by the providers of asset-backed
securities, i.e., the entities involved in securitization.
The relative roles of ﬁnancial institutions
and markets internationally
In some countries, such as Japan and Germany, loans
have dominated the ﬁnancial landscape. In others,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada,bothloansandmarketinstrumentshavebeen
used extensively to fund ultimate borrowers. Of
course, as we have seen, the type of entity that does
most of the borrowing has an important inﬂuence on
the instrument used. Governments in developed
countries tend to use bond markets to fund their deﬁ-
cits, while households normally borrow from ﬁnancial
institutions through mortgages or consumer loans of
various sorts. Small businesses also use ﬁnancial insti-
5.   Securitization currently represents almost 7 per cent of total borrowing.
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tutions to meet their funding needs. It is the large cor-
porate sector that has differed so signiﬁcantly across
countries in the way it has funded its ﬁnancial
requirements. (We consider this sector in more detail
in the following section.)
Interestingly, in the latter part of the 1980s, following a
long period of good performance by the Japanese and
German economies, a number of authors argued in
various books and articles that the German and Japa-
nese model of bank-led ﬁnancing was superior to the
“Anglo-Saxon” reliance on markets because of its abil-
ity to take a longer-term outlook and to support cor-
porations through temporary difﬁculties. More
recently, with the better performance through the
1990s of the U.S. and U.K. economies and the much
poorer performance of the German and Japanese
economies, some analysts have argued that market-
led systems are superior to bank-led systems, since
they allocate funds impartially and do not prop up
corporations that should be allowed to fail.
In a recent Bank of Canada working paper, Dolar and
Meh (2002) surveyed the academic literature and con-
cluded that, rather than being substitutes for each
other, bank lending and market ﬁnancing were com-
plements, suggesting that “the issue is not intermedi-
aries versus markets, but rather the creation of an
environment for better-functioning intermediaries
and markets.”6 Similarly, the increased interest in
emerging economies in recent years has led to exten-
sive research on the underpinnings of effective and
efﬁcient intermediation and to the formulation of the
“lawandﬁnanceview”ofﬁnancialdevelopment.This
perspective emphasizes the importance of an effective
and efﬁcient regulatory system, a sound legal environ-
ment, and solid arrangements for enforcing contracts
in creating a ﬁnancial services sector that supports
economic growth.
A Closer Look at Non-Financial
Businesses
We can further examine the behaviour of the non-
ﬁnancial business sector by using Bank of Canada
data, which have somewhat different coverage than
Statistics Canada data. The data published by the
Bank show the estimated amounts of business ﬁnance
outstanding at major private lenders (including loans
to non-bank ﬁnancial institutions and to government
business enterprises) and the securities issued by non-
6. For a comprehensive empirical study of this issue that reaches similar con-
clusions, see Levine (2002).7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
ﬁnancial businesses (including federal government
business enterprises).
Chart 4 shows the composition of external ﬁnancing
(deﬁned as funds raised from lenders and investors
but not retained earnings) based on the Bank of Can-
ada data. Consistent with the earlier discussion, the
chart shows the rise in the share of loans in the 1970s
and the reversal of this buildup in the 1980s and
1990s. It also shows the increasing importance of
short-term paper (bankers' acceptances plus commer-
cial paper) throughout the 1980s. Bonds and deben-
tures fell from about 20 per cent of external ﬁnancing
at the beginning of the 1970s to about 15 per cent at
the end of the decade, where they remained through
the 1980s, and then rose through the 1990s, reaching
about 27 per cent at the end of 2002. Finally, equity
issues declined from almost 45 per cent at the begin-
ning of the period to a low of just above 20 per cent in
the early 1980s, before recovering more recently to
34 per cent.
Interestingly, these trends mean that, for the non-
ﬁnancial business sector, the proportion of ﬁnance
from capital market sources (short-term paper, bonds,
equity) is currently broadly similar to what it was
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the share of funding from ﬁnancial institutions fol-
lowed by an offsetting contraction.
These trends mean that, for the
non-ﬁnancial business sector, the
proportion of ﬁnance from capital
market sources . . . is currently
broadly similar to what it was
thirty years ago, with a long period of
expansion in the share of funding
from ﬁnancial institutions followed
by an offsetting contraction.
A recent noteworthy development has been the
change in attitude of a number of Canadian banks
towards lending to large corporations (Freedman and
Goodlet 2002). The banks have publicly announced
that they will be reducing the size of their loan book to
large companies and concentrating on corporations
that undertake other business with them, particularly
capital market services such as underwriting. For
example, the National Post reported (23 October 2001)
that the Royal Bank is, “taking an axe to its corporate
loan division. RBC Capital Markets lends money to
about 1,000 corporate clients. The bank will focus on
about 500 'core' clients; the rest will be considered
non-essential, and the loans may not be renewed
when they come due.”
Two related factors appear to be behind the cutbacks
to large corporate lending. The ﬁrst is the sharp
increase in losses on such loans over the recent period.
The second is the apparent difﬁculty in pricing the
risks appropriately. To quote a senior Canadian com-
mercial banker (National Post, 5 April 2002), corporate
lending
is a market with little discipline and no real
barriers to entry. If it isn't the Swiss, it's the
Germans. If it's not the Germans, it's the
Americans. The Canadian banks . . . are also
far from saints. Somebody is always trying
to win market share. . . . In good times, the
proﬁtability of this product can only be
described as poor. In bad times, it is much,
much worse.8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
He went on to explain that the reason for lending to
large corporations is “collateral revenues,” presuma-
bly the fees from underwriting deals and advising on
mergers and acquisitions. As a Moody's (2002) report
put it, “for the Canadian banks, the loan syndication
market is the entrée into securities underwriting.”
Similarly, The Economist (11 January 2003) has reported
on the steady withdrawal of U.S. banks from lending
to companies with which they did not have additional
business. That article also reported data (compiled by
the Loan Pricing Corporation) that suggest that corpo-
rate lending yields signiﬁcantly less than other instru-
ments used to fund corporations, such as bonds.
This scenario raises a couple of puzzles from an eco-
nomic perspective. First, why has it proven so difﬁcult
to price the risk on loans to large corporations appro-
priately? Second, and relatedly, the implicit argument
behind linking loans to corporations and providing
capital market services to them is that corporate lend-
ing by itself is a low-return activity (which uses up
large amounts of bank capital), while capital market
services yield signiﬁcantly higher returns, such that
the overall return on capital to the bank from the com-
bined activity would be satisfactory. Indeed, some
dealers not associated with banks complain that they
ﬁnd it hard to compete with the bank-owned dealers
because they lack the banks’ capacity to offer lines of
credit for corporate lending. However, if corporate
lending does not offer a sufﬁciently high return to
cover the cost of the capital needed to support it, why
don't the spreads on such lending widen? Wider
spreads would allow a ﬁnancial service provider to
charge lower fees to the companies that use capital
market services, since the ﬁnancial service provider
would have less need to cross-subsidize the corporate
loans.7
Even if the linkage is based on economies of scope
(arising, say, from the joint use of information on the
company in corporate lending and in underwriting),
this would not explain the different rates of return on
the two types of activity, only the ability of the joint
supplier to undercut separate suppliers. The argu-
ment is sometimes made that corporate lending is a
low-return activity, since it has become commoditized
and can be met by a wide variety of suppliers, but this
does not resolve the puzzle. The ability of a company
to access lines of credit from a range of ﬁnancial serv-
7.   Anecdotal evidence suggests that this has begun to happen.
ice providers should make it easier, not harder, for the
company to use different ﬁrms to raise different kinds
of funds, and thus make it more difﬁcult for ﬁnancial
service providers to link the different types of serv-
ices.8
Are we moving to an environment in
which large corporations become
more dependent on market issues and
less on bank borrowing?
Other questions can be raised about this change in
bank behaviour. Are we moving to an environment in
which large corporations become more dependent on
market issues and less on bank borrowing? Will large
corporations become more closely tied to a single
bank and use that bank for all their requirements?
(This would be similar to the German hausbank or Jap-
anese main-bank model.) How will this affect loan
syndications? Will the concern about overconcen-
trated portfolios lead banks to withdraw further from
lending to large corporations and to focus their atten-
tion as lenders increasingly on households and small-
and medium-sized businesses? What are the macro-
economic implications, if any, of such changes?
Syndicated Lending, Securitization,
and Credit Derivatives
Until relatively recently, borrowing was done either
through markets (i.e., bonds and short-term paper) or
through ﬁnancial institutions (i.e., loans and mort-
gages) and the distinctions were very clear. Thus,
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions typically both
originated loans and maintained the loan on their bal-
ance sheets for its duration. Three elements in the loan
process—a positive decision on the loan application,
the provision of funds, and ongoing credit exposure—
were linked or bundled together. In recent years,
ﬁnancial engineering has allowed these three ele-
ments to be unbundled in a variety of ways. In some
8.   Another explanation offered for this tendency of borrowers to be more
closely linked to a single provider of loans and capital market services is that
borrowers prefer to be fully serviced by a single ﬁnancial service provider.
However, this explanation also fails to explain the puzzle related to the pric-
ing of the different components of the ﬁnancing relationship.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
of these ways, including syndicated loans and securi-
tization, the loan instrument becomes similar to a
marketable bond. To the two broad categories of bor-
rowing (market issues and ﬁnancial-institution ﬁnanc-
ing), we could thus add a third: hybrid instruments,
such as syndicated loans and securitized instruments,
which would fall between loan-type borrowing and
bond-type issues.
Syndicated lending
In loan syndications, the originating bank sells most of
a loan arrangement to other banks in the syndicate.
While the originating bank earns the fees from origi-
nation, it provides only a share (and sometimes only a
small share) of the ﬁnancing and assumes a corre-
sponding share of the exposure to losses. A key
advantage of syndication to the originating bank is
that its loan book does not become overly concen-
trated (i.e., insufﬁciently diversiﬁed) even though it
arranges loans that can be large relative to its capital.
Large loan syndications often comprise multiple loan
tranches with different terms and features. The short-
est maturities are typically targeted at traditional bank
purchasers, while the longer-term tranches are aimed
at institutional investors with longer-term horizons,
such as insurance companies and investment funds.
Secondary markets allow participants to adjust their
exposures by selling or purchasing shares of the loans
following the initial syndication.9
The loan-syndication process is most fully developed
in the United States. In Canada, with a small number
of large banks, loan syndicates still resemble “clubs.”
That is, for large corporate loans, the lead bank, which
is unwilling to take the full loan into its own portfolio
because of concern about the size of the exposure rela-
tive to its capital, will invite some or all of the other
large Canadian banks to participate in the loan. The
syndicated loan typically involves a one-year revolving
segment and a term-loan segment with a longer matu-
rity. Unlike in the United States, there does not exist in
Canada a liquid secondary market in which exposures
can be readily adjusted after the initial transaction.
In Canada, a signiﬁcant proportion of so-called “cor-
porate” loans, i.e., loans to large corporations, have
involved syndication. In contrast, commercial or mid-
sized loans are typically held on the books of the orig-
inating banks, in part since their smaller size does not
result in concerns about the magnitude of the expo-
sure relative to capital for the lending bank.
9.   For a more detailed discussion of loan syndication, see Armstrong (2003).
Securitization
Securitization of loans—packaging a group of loans
and issuing a security or series of securities giving the
purchasers a claim on the package of loans—began in
the United States in the mortgage-lending area and
has since spread to credit card loans, receivables, other
household loans, and small business loans. The securi-
tization process typically also involves some form of
credit enhancement by the originating institution or
other party, which reduces the credit risk to the pur-
chasers of the asset. For example, the underlying
mortgage loans may be guaranteed by a government
agency, or the loans may be insured against default by
an insurance company. In some instruments, there are
various loan tranches, ranging from less risky to more
risky, and the purchasers can choose tranches that sat-
isfy their appetite for risk and return.
Chart 5 presents the percentage of Canadian mort-
gages (mostly residential mortgages) that are securi-
tized, which has risen gradually to its current level of
over 11 per cent, and the percentage of Canadian
consumer credit that is securitized, which has risen
more sharply in recent years, to almost 20 per cent. In
contrast, about 50 per cent of U.S. residential mort-
gages and about 35 per cent of U.S. consumer credit
are now securitized. The securitization of other loans
in Canada appears to be considerably less important
than it is for mortgages and consumer credit, amount-
ing to less than 7 per cent of total loans at the end of
2002 (according to Statistics Canada data).
Chart 5
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Differences in the term of mortgage loans and the
method of their ﬁnancing account for the different
outcomes in the two countries. In the United States in
the 1970s, savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks were the major providers of mortgage
ﬁnancing for households. On the asset side of their
balance sheet, they held mortgage loans with a 25- to
30-year term to maturity, while on the liability side
they funded these loans with much shorter-term
deposits. As long as interest rates were relatively sta-
ble, this arrangement functioned reasonably well, and
the institutions proﬁted from the spread between
longer-term loan rates and shorter-term deposit rates.
The onset of inﬂationary pressures in the latter part of
the 1960s and through the 1970s, however, ushered in
much more volatile interest rates. As a result, there
was rationing of credit at times of high interest rates
when deposit-rate ceilings were in effect in the United
States (which inhibited the funding of these institu-
tions). And, with this sort of term mismatch on the
books of the specialized mortgage lenders, loan losses
followed the removal of the deposit-rate ceilings.
These losses eventually led to the sharp contraction of
the savings and loan sector.10 Securitization of mort-
gages effectively changed the funding of mortgages,
from a short-term source (i.e., short-term deposits) to
a longer-term source (i.e., longer-term investors in
mortgage-backed securities or MBSs) and hence
largely eliminated the term mismatch that was the
initial source of problems for the savings and loan
industry.
Why did the same process not play out in Canada?
The answer is that, because of changes in legal
arrangements, more risk-averse ﬁnancial institutions,
and perhaps luck, Canadian mortgages in the late
1960s changed from ﬁxed-rate 25- or 30-year instru-
ments to instruments with an interest rate that rolled
over every ﬁve years (or less). And, crucially impor-
tant, the trust companies and banks that were the
main providers of mortgage ﬁnancing for households
were able to match the 5-year interest rate commit-
ment on their mortgages with deposits that had a
5-year term. Later on, they offered a full range of terms,
from ﬂoating to ﬁve years (and even 7- and 10-year
terms), but they were able to match the term of the
10.  The full history of the U.S. savings and loan industry would also have to
take into account the ability of these institutions to continue to operate in the
face of losses because of deposit insurance and forbearance by supervisors, as
well as the regulatory broadening of the types of businesses in which they
could engage.
assets with that of their deposit or other liabilities.
The Canadian ﬁnancial institutions were thus able to
avoid the risk of term mismatch and earn a reasonable
proﬁt from the spread between loan rates and deposit
rates. There was thus little incentive for the MBS mar-
ket to develop in Canada in the same way as it did in
the United States.
A proportionately much smaller MBS market did
develop in Canada in the 1990s for two quite different
reasons than in the United States. First, with the
increased emphasis on capital, banks chose to limit the
growth in capital requirements by moving some of
their assets off their balance sheet. By securitizing part
of their mortgage portfolio, they were able to slow the
growth of the assets against which capital had to be
held. Second, with the increased attractiveness of
mutual funds, deposit-taking ﬁnancial institutions
found it harder to attract term deposits to match
5-year mortgages. While they were able to use interest
rate swaps to lock in 5-year funds or go to the whole-
sale market for 5-year ﬁnancing, it turned out to be
more proﬁtable in some cases to securitize the mort-
gages (and earn the fees associated with securitiza-
tion) than to hold them on their books.
Credit derivatives
While both syndication and securitization have con-
tinued to provide banks with ways of limiting and
diversifying their exposure to credit risk, a more
recently developed form of ﬁnancial engineering,
credit derivatives, has become increasingly important
in the last few years.11 This instrument allows a bank
to continue to hold a loan on its books while selling
part or all of the credit risk to another entity that is
willing to sell risk protection in return for a fee. If the
event speciﬁed in the credit derivative contract takes
place, the seller of the credit derivative (i.e., the pro-
vider of protection) pays the purchaser of the credit
derivative for the loss incurred. For example, if the
speciﬁed risk is the bankruptcy of the company to
which the loan was made and this is the event that
triggers payment, the bank originating the loan is pro-
tected against the loss associated with the bankruptcy.
An important advantage of a credit derivative over a
loan syndication is that the borrower is not aware that
the bank with which it is doing business has chosen to
limit its credit exposure to the borrower.
11. For a more detailed discussion of credit derivatives, see Kiff and Morrow
(2000).11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
While both syndication and
securitization have continued to
provide banks with ways of limiting
and diversifying their exposure to
credit risk, a more recently developed
form of ﬁnancial engineering, credit
derivatives, has become increasingly
important in the last few years.
Although banks have been natural buyers of credit
derivatives (purchasers of credit protection), they
have also sold credit derivatives (provided credit pro-
tection). By doing so, they have been able to diversify
their credit risks across corporations more broadly
than they would have been able to do simply on the
basis of the loan holdings in their portfolios. Data
from a survey of ﬁnancial institutions by the British
Bankers’ Association presented in Chart 6 show that
banks, securities houses, and hedge funds were net
purchasers of credit protection, while insurance com-
panies and reinsurers were net sellers.
Chart 6
Breakdown of Credit-Derivative Market
Participants
Showing protection bought and sold
Per cent of total firms































While credit derivatives have grown rapidly, they are
still very small in value compared to other forms of
derivatives. Moreover, they have not yet become a
major factor in Canadian loan markets, perhaps
because of the large size of the major Canadian banks,
which enables them to diversify loan risk on their bal-
ance sheet much more effectively than smaller banks,
and because of the use of syndication to diversify
lending risks. However, some Canadian banks have
been involved in U.S. credit-derivative markets.
Bond and Equity-Market
Developments: The Hollowing Out
of Canadian Capital Markets?
With increasing globalization, some observers have
questioned the future of the bond and stock markets
in countries that are on the periphery. Will they con-
tinue to exist and to prosper or will activity increas-
ingly shift to the more liquid, more resilient, and
deeper markets in the major countries? In the case of
Canada, we know that a signiﬁcant amount of bor-
rowing by Canadian corporations takes place in U.S.
bond markets and that an appreciable number of large
corporations are cross-listed on U.S. stock exchanges.
Is this a harbinger of a future in which Canadian
ﬁnancial markets become ever less important, or is it a
reﬂection of a longstanding and viable situation in
which Canadian corporations make use of both Cana-
dian and U.S. ﬁnancial markets to conduct their
ﬁnancing?
Bond markets
To begin to address these questions, it is useful to
examine the borrowing behaviour of Canadian corpo-
rations over the past 25 years. We do this using Bank
of Canada data that divide corporate bond issues by
currency of denomination and country of issue.
Chart 7 shows the percentage distribution of out-
standing bonds issued by Canadian corporations,
both non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial (as well as govern-
ment enterprises), including issues of asset-backed
securities related to securitization.12 Over the ﬁrst
decade covered by the data (1975–1985), a declining
share, but well over half, of the outstanding issues
were in Canadian dollars and issued in Canada. This
ratio has remained at around 50 per cent since the
12.  Excluding asset-backed securities from these data does not materially
change the conclusions provided here.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
mid-1980s. Euro-Canadian, Euro-U.S.-dollar, and
other currency issues all rose through the 1980s
and fell back in the 1990s.13 Corresponding to these
developments, during the 1990s, the share of out-
standing bonds denominated in U.S. dollars and
issued in U.S. markets increased and captured the
share of issues that were no longer going into the lat-
ter types of instruments.
Chart 8 combines Canadian-dollar and Euro-Cana-
dian-dollar issues, and similarly combines U.S.-dollar
and Euro-U.S.-dollar issues. Clearly there has been a
very gradual decline in Canadian-dollar issues over
much of the 1990s, while U.S.-dollar issues have risen
over the same period. However, considering that the
measurement of the foreign currency component is
inﬂated by the depreciation of the Canadian dollar
over this period, it is noteworthy that the Canadian-
dollar share more or less maintained its level.
It is also worth noting that corporate bond issues as a
whole, both non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial, grew very
rapidly in all markets in the 1990s, as did the Cana-
dian-dollar component of these issues. When account
is taken of the low rate of inﬂation and, hence, of the
relatively low growth of nominal GDP over the period,
the growth rates are striking. As a percentage of GDP,
Canadian-dollar corporate bonds outstanding rose
from 9.0 per cent in 1991 to 10.0 per cent in 1996 to
13.   Euro-Canadian securities are Canadian-dollar issues placed outside
Canada; Euro-U.S.-dollar securities are U.S.-dollar issues placed outside the
United States.
Chart 7





























16.5 per cent in 2001. Thus, virtually all of the increase
came in the second half of the period (1996–2001)
when the federal government was moving into a
budget surplus and reducing its demands on the
Canadian bond market.
Over the same period (1996–2001), when federal gov-
ernment debt denominated in Canadian dollars was
declining in absolute value, provincial governments
were shifting from foreign currency debt to Canadian-
dollar debt, and term debt issued to ﬁnance securitiza-
tions increased rapidly. Thus, over the ﬁve years,
Canadian-dollar debt excluding federal government
debt increased by 55 per cent, while total Canadian-
dollar debt (i.e., including federal government debt)
rose by 28 per cent, similar to the growth of nominal
GDP. “Crowding in” of non-federal debt was very
much at work over the period.
Another, slightly different perspective can be gained
by examining net new issues over the period (Chart 9)
rather than levels outstanding. While choppy, these
data show that for all corporations, the proportion of
bonds issued in Canada over the last 15 years,
although lower than the proportion seen before the
mid-1970s, has, on balance, remained at about half the
total.
Why do Canadian corporations choose to borrow in
foreign markets? A number of factors may affect their
behaviour, although there is little empirical evidence
regarding their relative importance. First, the size of
issues clearly plays a role, with the average size of
Chart 8
Per Cent Distribution of Outstanding Bonds Issued
by Canadian Corporations
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issues in the deeper U.S. market clearly larger than in
the Canadian market. Corporations trying to raise
large amounts of funds in the bond market are thus
more apt to issue bonds in the U.S. market than in the
Canadian market. In 2001, for example, the average
size of U.S-dollar issues of Canadian corporate bor-
rowers was more than three times that of Canadian-
dollar issues. Second, longer terms to maturity are
available in the U.S. market than in the Canadian mar-
ket.
A third factor may be the natural hedge that Canadian
exporters have when borrowing in U.S. dollars. With
the increase in Canada-U.S. trade in recent years, this
factor may have increased in importance. Similarly,
Canadian corporations that are considering direct
investments in the United States will take into account
the natural hedge from denominating their borrowing
in U.S. dollars.
A fourth factor relates to the growing role of the high-
yield market in ﬁnancing high-tech and telecom com-
panies, companies without a long track record, and
other companies with lower credit ratings, and to the
very limited size of the high-yield market in Canada.
The Canadian high-yield market is very much in its
infancy and is characterized by a small number of
issuers and a low value of outstanding debt. After a
hesitant start, it peaked in 1997, when it accounted for
an estimated 6 to 7 per cent of total corporate debt
issues. The market stalled the next year in the after-
math of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent
Russian debt default and near-collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM). It has since accounted
Chart 9
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for 3 per cent or less of annual corporate debt issuance
in Canada. High-yield Canadian borrowers thus meet
almost all of their ﬁnancing requirements in the
United States, where a deep and liquid high-yield
market exists.14 This high-yield debt accounted for
roughly 40 to 50 per cent of the value of U.S.-dollar
debt issued by Canadian ﬁrms in recent years.
Finally, at times when the federal government was a
large borrower in the Canadian bond market, it
crowded out other borrowers, which then turned to
foreign bond markets, most notably the U.S. bond
market.
Equity markets
In the last 15 years, there has been increased reliance
on foreign placements of net new equity issues. Nev-
ertheless, the share of foreign placements of new
issues—although volatile—seems relatively small,
averaging about 12 per cent in the last ﬁve years
(Chart 10). Thus, while the share of net new equity
issues placed abroad has tended to increase in recent
years, the vast majority of such issues are still placed
in Canada.15
In the 1990s, the number of Canadian-based issues
listed on both U. S. and Canadian exchanges increased
sharply. Scaling these data by the number of stocks
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange shows that the
14.   Canadian lenders wishing to purchase high-yield debt also tend to go to
the U.S. market, which offers the possibility of more diversiﬁcation than the
narrower Canadian market.
15.   Although these data include income trusts, their exclusion would not
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Chart 10
Total Net New Stock Issues: All Corporations14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
percentage of interlisted ﬁrms increased modestly in
the last 15 or so years, from about 12 per cent in the
mid-1980s to about 15 per cent more recently
(Chart 11).16
Although the absolute volume and value of trading of
interlisted stocks on U.S. exchanges has also increased
16.   Measuring this by market capitalization would likely indicate a larger
interlisted presence.
Chart 11
Proportion of Interlisted Shares on the TSX:
1980–2002
Number of Canadian-based issues interlisted on U.S. exchanges/number of
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(Chart 12), there has been little change since the mid-
1980s in the proportion of the value of these stocks
traded on U.S. exchanges. About 40 to 50 per cent of
total trading in interlisted stocks is on U.S. exchanges,
which has been the case for some time (Chart 13).
Finally, the number of Canadian-based ﬁrms listing
exclusively on U.S. exchanges declined steadily from
the mid-1990s through 2002 (Chart 14).
Chart 13
U.S. Exchanges’ Share of Trading in Canadian-Based
Interlisted Issues: 1980–2002
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Have Canadian markets been hollowed out?
What are the implications of this analysis of bond- and
stock-market issues by Canadian corporations? The
main ﬁndings from the data are as follows:
• The corporate sector has had a large appe-
tite for foreign sources of ﬁxed-income
ﬁnance since the early 1980s.
• The share of total corporate bonds issued
in Canadian dollars (and placed in Canada)
has nevertheless remained fairly steady, at
about half, over the past 15 or so years.
• While Canadian equity issuers are turn-
ing more to foreign markets, the extent of
that reliance is currently small.
• The percentage of Canadian-based ﬁrms
interlisting on U.S. exchanges has
increased only modestly in the last dec-
ade, to about 15 per cent. And there has
been little change since the mid-1980s in
the percentage of trading of interlisted
stocks on U.S. exchanges.
• There has been a downward trend in the
number of ﬁrms listing exclusively on
U.S. exchanges.
• In sum, despite somewhat increased reli-
ance on foreign sources of funds over the
last decade, the data reviewed here do not
provide much support for the view that
domestic capital markets have been aban-
doned by Canadian ﬁrms or have been
hollowed out. But other observers have
reached more pessimistic conclusions and
are concerned about future develop-
ments.
The data reviewed here do not
provide much support for the view
that domestic capital markets have
been abandoned by Canadian ﬁrms or
have been hollowed out.
Looking forward, what factors are likely to inﬂuence
the decisions by Canadian ﬁrms on whether to ﬁnance
themselves in domestic or foreign markets? First, as
noted earlier, U.S. capital markets are deeper and
more liquid, which might allow easier access to
cheaper capital for some Canadian ﬁrms (and also
attract Canadian investors). Second, the breadth of
instruments available for hedging credit risk contrib-
utes to the structuring and placement of more risky
transactions abroad.
Third, it is possible that regulation of Canadian ﬁnan-
cial markets is less efﬁcient than it could be, which in
effect taxes capital market activity in Canada. While,
broadly speaking, easy access by Canadian ﬁrms to
foreign sources of ﬁxed-income and equity capital is
positive for these ﬁrms, the possible inefﬁciency of
capital market regulation in Canada remains a policy
concern.17 In response to this concern, both federal
and provincial authorities and market participants are
working to increase the efﬁciency and effectiveness of
Canadian ﬁnancial markets and thereby facilitate the
ﬁnancing of Canadian corporations in Canada.
Fourth, a key factor of continuing importance con-
cerning the ability of the corporate sector to ﬁnance
itself in Canadian markets will be the crowding in per-
mitted by the absence of large net government issues
of bonds in Canada as governments balance their
budgets or run only small deﬁcits.
Finally, a somewhat theoretical point. As long as
Canadian residents wish to hold Canadian-dollar
assets—and there is no reason to believe that they will
not for the foreseeable future—such assets will be in
demand, thereby providing an incentive for govern-
ments and domestic ﬁrms to supply such securities,
including corporate bonds and equities. On this basis,
we would therefore expect a Canadian capital market
to continue to exist and to grow.
What would help Canadian markets to ﬂourish?
• An efﬁcient regulatory system
• Continuing ﬁscal discipline on the part
of Canadian governments—just as large
ﬁscal deﬁcits crowded out private borrow
ers in earlier decades, ﬁscal consolidation
will encourage their participation in the
future, and
• Recent trends inincreased innovation and
improved risk assessment in Canadian
capital markets need to continue.
17.   For an overview of issues and of possible regulatory models, see Harris
(2002) and MacKay (2002).16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2003
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